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constants need not be enduring substances but may be the invariant laws according to which the changes take place. If the actually formulated laws of our physics can be shown to undergo change themselves, it can only be in reference to something else which is constant in relation to them. This justifies the Kantian contention for *a priori* elements in experience, in the sense that every science must assume some invariant connections or categories. The Kantians, however, are wrong in claiming absolute logical necessity for material principles such as those of Euclid's geometry, Newton's mechanics or Christian ethics. These principles are assumptions which may be necessary for some of the consequences drawn from them, but they are not absolutely necessary, since it is possible to reject these consequences. This view agrees with the experimental theory of knowledge and morals, except so far as the latter seems to repeat Hume's denial of objectively necessary relations or rules. Without the latter there can be no rational experiment or significant doubt.

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PROFESSOR SPAULDING'S NON-EXISTENT ILLUSIONS

PROFESSOR SPAULDING'S recent volume entitled *The New Rationalism* must be a source of delight to every realist of whatever school. Seldom has so thorough-going a defense of realism been made. Relatively little emphasis, moreover, has been put upon those special features which characterize that school of realism to which Professor Spaulding has for years belonged, and in fact by the omission of a few passages a dualistic realist might perfectly well accept all of the author's arguments and conclusions. The one point of importance upon which his views diverge greatly from those of other realists who do not care to call themselves "new" is to be found in his retention of "pan-objectivism" and his insistence that illusion, hallucination, and error must not be classed as mental. If in examining this part of Professor Spaulding's position I seem to be severe in my criticisms, I trust he will remember that I am prompted thereto by my sympathy with and my admiration for the greater part of his admirable book and by the conviction that he is nearer to the old and true type of realism than he is himself aware.

The question of illusion and error is touched upon, in various parts of *The New Rationalism*, but in no place is there an inclusive and systematic statement of the author's position upon the subject.

By putting together the various passages, however, which treat of this question, one finds three distinct answers to the common assertion that illusions are mental in their nature. These answers are, namely, the following: (1) illusions have a perfectly good causal explanation; (2) they consist in taking one entity to be another which it is not, or in localizing it in the wrong place or the wrong time; (3) they are not existents but mere subsistents.

The first of these answers will be recognized by the reader as one long made familiar through the writings of both neorealists and pragmatists. The convergence of the parallel rails when one looks at a long line of railway track, the straight stick bent in water, do not, we are told, require consciousness to explain them: "for the convergence may be a characteristic *of*, and have a locus *in the relational complex*, light-traveling-in-straight-lines-from-each-rail-to-the-eyes, or to a photographic plate, and the bentness be a characteristic of the *complex* light-rays-coming-from-the-stick-through-the-refractive-medium-of-water."

It can but strike the dualistic realist as odd that an argument so often answered and intrinsically so irrelevant as this should still find a place in a book of the high standard of *The New Rationalism*. The argument I have called irrelevant for the good reason that it has nothing in particular to do with the case. No one is concerned to deny that illusions have a physical cause. And, in the illustrations used, the causes are doubtless the ones pointed out by Professor Spaulding—the converging or bent light rays. But *are* the rays the rails or the stick? If not, what is the locus of the converging *rails* and of the bent *stick*? If the bent stick is not mental but physical, and if it be (as pan-objectivism must maintain) numerically identical with the straight stick, then is not the same stick both straight and not straight at the same time, and in the same sense? I see no way of avoiding this, nor am I at all helped by any explanations, however elaborate, of the physical and psychophysiological processes by which the sensation of the bent stick is brought about.

But the most formidable part of the difficulty of making illusions non-mental is to be found not in their sensory but in their perceptual aspect. There is no real deception in the ordinary illusion, such as the bent stick. But if, as sometimes happens, I not only have the kind of visual sensation which the bent rays from a stick in water naturally produce, but also *perceive* a bent stick—take the stick which is my object to be bent—then my perception with its implicit judgment is an error. The reality of error Professor Spaulding not only admits but insists upon. The reduction of illusion to error, is, in fact, one of the three answers which he gives to

the illusion problem to which reference was made above. But while it is true that a most important aspect of the illusion situation may justly be analyzed into erroneous judgment, it is plain that one can not in this way make illusion anything but mental. To seek to do so is to jump from the frying pan into the fire. For if illusion be error, what is error? Is it not even more obviously subjective in its nature than illusion itself? When taken off his guard, indeed, Professor Spaulding quite frankly admits that error is subjective and thus gives away his case. "The final and irreducible subjective element in error," he writes, "is only the psychological fact of the taking a thing to be what it is not." If "taking a thing to be what it is not" be "psychological" and "subjective," what need we of any further witness?

In more self-conscious moments, however, Professor Spaulding refuses to make this fatal admission, and invents the third way out of the difficulty which I indicated early in this paper. Errors, it seems, are not "subjective" nor "psychological facts" after all. Of course they are not physical. It results therefore that they can not be existents at all, but must be merely "subsistents." So far as I can find, Professor Spaulding nowhere states definitely that no errors exist, or ever have existed (even in the minds of his opponents), and I hesitate to affirm that he would deliberately stand for so astonishing an assertion. Yet in his table of the universe (on p. 494) he definitely places "false hypothetical entities, *e. g.*, phlogiston" among non-existing subsistents; and as no errors of any kind are placed in his list of existents, it seems clear that he stands for the assertion, which he hesitates to make explicitly, that no error has ever existed.

This non-existence theory is, at any rate, his final solution of the problem concerning "illusory and hallucinatory objects," such as "dreams" and the "snakes of tremens," as well as "imagined entities such as centaurs and satyrs." Dreams and their content do not exist. They never have existed. They simply subsist. The dream that I dreamt last night and the dream which no one ever dreamt, but which somebody who never lived might have dreamt if he had lived, are on exactly the same level. One never existed any more than the other. No evidence whatever is given for this astounding statement. This need surprise no one, however, for it is hard to see how any evidence for it could be found. Perhaps, therefore, one ought not to ask for any. One does, nevertheless, feel compelled to ask on what basis a distinction shall be made between existents and mere subsistents which shall rule last night's dream out of existence. Professor Spaulding is too well aware of the necessity for an answer to this question to let it go by unanswered, and

through several pages that form the kernel of his discussion he attempts to formulate his definition in such fashion as will answer to the needs of his theory. He starts out by defining an existent as "an entity that either has been, is now, or will be 'at' or 'in' a particular place at a particular time, or merely at a particular time, if the entity is not spatial, as *e. g.*, a conscious process is not" (p. 490). So far all is plain sailing, the definition being so constructed as to admit into the realm of existence both physical and psychical entities, the latter including "any process, simple or complex, of perceiving, remembering, imagining, reasoning, willing, and all emotions" (p. 494). Other passages show that sensations also belong here (*cf.* pp. 473-78). This use of specific spatial or temporal embodiment as the differentia of existence is a common one and will be acceptable to a great many. But, as transpires, it will not really be acceptable to Professor Spaulding after all, for it would only too plainly admit hallucinatory objects to existence. Hence there follows a series of logical wriggings in search of a satisfactory definition. The spatio-temporal differentiation quoted above is termed "partial" and a new one is attempted. "To be 'in' or 'at' or to 'occupy' a 'particular' space and time, both, or only one," we are now told, "is not enough to define or characterize existents. For other entities, such as dream objects, also have this spatial and temporal particularity. Therefore a complex existent must have *that full quota of characteristics*, or *be that full quota*, which the sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the like find it *empirically* to have." This at first seems to do the business of sweeping dreams and other undesirables out of existence. It ought to, for it was plainly, even admittedly, manufactured *ad hoc*. Yet when Professor Spaulding reads it over it turns out to be unsatisfactory after all. Even he is not prepared to deny that a dream has that full quota of characteristics which psychology finds an existent to have—(whatever that may mean!) "Existents," he admits, "are of two kinds, namely physical and mental. . . . Mental existents are to be accepted essentially as they are interpreted by empirical psychology, namely as processes or events that occur at a certain specific time." Hence the definition has not done its work after all, for if applied in such fashion as to rule dreams out of existence it would do the same for sensations. In despair, then, of constructing a definition by which dreams and hallucinations shall be excluded from existence while "perceiving, remembering, imagining and all emotions" shall be retained, Professor Spaulding falls back on dogmatism. Dreams, hallucinatory and imagined objects, although admittedly they are "experienced," "are *not* existents" (p. 492). And for lack of any better reason for his assertion, he returns to a

repetition of the utterly inadequate differentiation used in vain upon the preceding page. They are *not* existents "for they are found to lack that *full quota* of qualities, including temporal and spatial localization, which psychology and physics recognize as essential to objects that *exist*." Just what this full quota of qualities may be we are never told except that temporal and spatial localization are among them; and that temporal localization alone is sufficient to confer existence we are explicitly assured. Nor can it be said that by the sentence just quoted hallucinations, *etc.*, are ruled out of existence because they are not recognized by both "psychology and physics;" for if that be the principle of differentiation then normal mental entities are also ruled out of existence, and to this Professor Spaulding (very properly) will not for a moment listen. In short, either temporal localization is sufficient to differentiate the existent from the non-existent, or it is not. If it is, then dreams and hallucinations, dream objects and hallucinatory objects, exist. If not, then no psychical entities exist. Professor Spaulding can not have it both ways. What is sauce for the goose is generally thought to go pretty well with the gander.

In other words, Professor Spaulding, with all the ponderous machinery of modern logic at his disposal, has been quite unable to propose or manufacture a definition of existence according to which normal mental entities shall be existents and hallucinatory ones non-existents. Much less has he been able to give any reason for the distinction which he seeks, but fails, to draw. The *motive*, however, which prompted his attempt is perfectly plain and in fact comes out explicitly in his own clear statement. In the sentence following the one last quoted, in which he had asserted the non-existence of hallucinatory entities, he continues: "Therefore they are excluded from being psychological in character (as tradition has so long held them to be) by the hypothesis, now accepted at this point as established, that consciousness is not a substance or 'container'." Here the cat gets out of the bag. By hook or by crook, by logic or in defiance of logic as well as of experience, dreams, *etc.*, must at all hazards be kept out of the realm of existence, for if they were admitted, there would be no place for them but consciousness; and in that case one would have to acknowledge that consciousness was some sort of "container." To such extremes is a logician driven in the desperate effort to save a theory. If this be the New Rationalism, the shade of Aristotle may rest content that his logic is condemned as old.

In the sentence last quoted, the hypothesis that consciousness is not a "substance or container" is spoken of as "established." The reader may be a little put to it to recall how the hypothesis was established; but by going back over the preceding 492 pages he will

find that the argument in its favor consists in taking it for granted that only substances can be "containers" and then attacking the Aristotelian view of substance. Substance is a category of which the new logic makes no use; hence there is no such thing as substance; hence consciousness can not be a substance. Something like that, I gather, is the author's view, though here I may be misinterpreting him. In any case, I am not concerned to defend the Aristotelian or the medieval notion of substance. I am well aware that to call consciousness a substance would, in the psychological atmosphere of to-day, have the same effect as that of giving a dog a bad name. I would, however, point out that those who regard hallucinatory objects as mental, and who in that sense consider consciousness a "container," need not, and usually do not, consider consciousness a "substance." They may perfectly well define consciousness not as a substance but as a certain *class of entities* (a pious form of words to-day)—a class of entities, moreover, which may enter into enough different sorts of series, by being properly shuffled, to satisfy the most voracious and the newest logician. Consciousness as a class might perfectly well contain illusory entities without being a substance. The objections, therefore, to the mental nature of illusions based upon the difficulties involved in the Aristotelian substance are entirely negligible.

It is a bit odd that Professor Spaulding should be so insistent that the class of entities known as consciousness should not contain hallucinatory objects as well as normal sensations. For there is nothing in such a position in any way inconsistent with his own view of the nature of consciousness. The orthodox neo-realistic doctrine that consciousness is a relation he respectfully, tenderly, but none the less firmly rejects (p. 481). Consciousness for him is perfectly real, and conscious entities are existents and are quite distinct from physical existents. (See pages 253, 256, 373, 447, 484-85, 490.) To be sure, he analyses conscious entities into "dimensions," but these conscious "dimensions" remain a distinct class by themselves. Nor is the mental nature of hallucination in any way inconsistent with this view of consciousness. With a little manipulation it would be as easy to show that hallucinations are "dimensions" as to do the same for sensations. Nor is there anything in the nature of a class of "dimensions" which would make it incapable of being a "container" for hallucinations, illusions and errors. Not only, therefore, has Professor Spaulding been unable to prove that hallucinations and their content are non-existents; not only has he been unable even to formulate a definition of existence which would exclude them; he can not even show that there is anything inconsistent with his own theory of consciousness in the view that they are mental.

Why then, one is impelled to ask, does Professor Spaulding so often and so persistently attempt to rule them out of the mental world? He does not tell us. But the reader who looks between the lines will hazard a shrewd guess as to the real (though probably but half-conscious) motive. As I suggested at the beginning of this paper, Professor Spaulding is really much nearer to dualistic realism than he is willing to admit, and he clings desperately to the term "pan-objectivism" with its correlative assertion of the non-mental nature of illusions, as among the few last bonds that connect him with the radical neo-realism of 1910. But as he has already given away the case by his admission that normal mental phenomena are distinct existents, his loyal use of the approved form of words concerning illusions is hardly more than a somewhat pathetic expression of his sentiment for the good old times; and his type of pan-objectivism, if scrutinized closely, is easily seen to be but verbal. The assertion that all reality is objective has at least two quite distinct meanings. It may mean either (1) that there are no merely psychical existents, or (2) that all entities, whether psychical, physical or merely subsistent, are real objects, are "somewhere in the universe" (p. 487), have a reality of their own which is not dependent on anybody's knowing them. The first of these two meanings is the one for which the new realism stands and which Professor Spaulding very explicitly rejects. The second meaning is the one which Professor Spaulding has in mind when he asserts "pan-objectivism." To this kind of "pan-objectivism" a dualistic and by no means "new" realist might well be quite as loyal as the author of *The New Rationalism*, though he would be likely to suggest that the term "pan-objectivism" was a peculiarly poor one for the doctrine in question.

But we shall not quarrel over terms, and Professor Spaulding's rejection of the orthodox neo-realistic doctrine of consciousness, as shown by his most heretical differentiation of psychical facts from other entities, will be welcomed by the majority of realists as a new token of a reform movement within neo-realism. Signs of the disintegration of its radical pan-objectivism were, indeed, manifest even before it was fully formed. Very early in its history, and within the very volume which enunciated the platform of the new sect, Professor Montague rejected, if he did not in fact revile, the faith. And now another of the number has begun to see the light. I trust that neither Professor Montague nor Professor Spaulding nor the other members of this group, to which contemporary thought owes so much, will take it ill if I conclude by saying that we of the older

school of realism stand ready to receive back our brother realists with open arms and glad hearts.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Education for Character. FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1917. Pp. 442.

This book proposes no single panacea for the moral regeneration of the world. Possibly this is because the author has spent four years in actual moral instruction of high-school adolescents, as we learn in the preface. Indeed this fact furnishes the key to much that we find in the volume. It doubtless explains why the writer so fully and frankly recognizes the enormous difficulties in the way of imparting truly functional moral ideals. It certainly explains the sanity and practical nature of the methods described for achieving this end. The peculiar limitations as well as the advantages of the various means of moral education are clearly set forth. These limitations are such indeed that a simple total of their combined potencies would hardly be adequate. But it is held that in moral psychology, two and two instead of equaling four frequently equal nine or ten, which saves the situation. The enunciation of this principle raises an exceedingly important psychological problem which deserves special investigation.

The factors which enter into right conduct are three in number—knowing what is right conduct under given circumstances, the desire to do the right once it is known, and lastly “an open road between desire and action.” Moral instruction is concerned chiefly with imparting moral ideas while moral training is concerned with seeing that the ideas function in action. Both should conduce to the “love of the right” or the desire to do right, which is the most important and comprehensive of the three. The various agencies for securing moral training are examined. School discipline, pupil government, mutual aid in the class room, special organization of extra-curricular activities and (what is regarded as most important of all) the actual participation by the pupils in the civic work of the community, are described in the concrete as they have been administered in American schools. It is shown specifically how moral instruction, as contrasted with moral training, may be given in connection with the study of history, literature, civics and especially biography. But in addition there is required a systematic course of moral instruction fittingly called a course in the “conduct of life.”